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Consumersí Rights in the Laissez-Faire
Economy: How Much Caveat for the Emptor?
Jan Narveson*
I.

INTRODUCTION

What are the Consumerís rights in a free enterprise
economy? It is tempting to supply a one-word answer: None.
After all, the Consumer has the final word: ìNo!î What more do
we need? But to say this would be misleading. To begin with,
the right to say No! is itself a major right, more important
perhaps than anything else. And it is a right; so the answer
ìnoneî is misleading, indeed just false. Further thought suggests
that the situation is quite a bit more complicated than that.
When the would-be Consumer becomes a customer, she needs to
exercise judgment and caution. But the thesis that all the
responsibility rests on the Consumerís shoulders must be
rejected, despite the plausibility of a simple invoking of caveat
emptor (ìLet the buyer beware!î). This essay will propose a
general criterion as being the basically right one to apply.
II. RIGHTS IN GENERAL
A.

What Are They?

To begin with, perhaps we had better make clear what rights
are. To have a right is to have a status that somehow imposes
requirements on others. In the case where these are legal
requirements, they would be enforceable either by the
institutions of the civil law or even by those of criminal law. A
theory about rights is a theory about the ìsomehowî: it would tell
us how it is that the people who (so the theorist claims) earn the
* Professor of Philosophy at the University of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada.
He is the
author of several books including The Libertarian Idea, Moral Matters, and Respecting
Persons in Theory and Practice, as well as some hundreds of articles and reviews, mostly
on ethical and political theory or applications, in anthologies and journals. He has
appeared at some hundreds of colloquia and meetings in his career, and is also a music
enthusiast and patron, especially of chamber music, which he promotes in many concerts
in his home and elsewhere. For these and other activities, he has recently been made an
Officer of the Order of Canada.
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status of rightholder do, in fact, earn itówhat are the
characteristics of the rightholder and his or her relation to others
that leads to the fixing of duties on the part of those against
whom these rights are held. All rights entail duties to refrain
from certain actions, namely those that would render it
impossible for the agent to do what he or she is being said to
have the right to do. Another sort of right, one that additionally
entails positive requirements to act on the institutions of the law
to provide protections to the rightholder, is also conceptually
definable. The general point, then, is simply that when we talk
of someoneís rights, we are thereby talking of someone elseís
duties. In the case of Consumers and Sellers, the Consumerís
right is, in some way or another, the Sellerís duty.
Letís begin the present inquiry, then, by pointing out that
everyone has rightsóconsumers and producers alike. (And letís
not forget that all of us are both.) Whether there are ìconsumerís
rightsî is then a question of whether we have, in our capacity as
consumers, any special rights, over and above what we already
have generally as people. And the answer to this too, I shall
argue, is in the affirmative. However, I shall also argue that we
can, given a suitably normal description of the situations of
consumers in relation to suppliers, deduce consumer rights from
a more general thesis not confined to consumers.
B.

Why?

We need to make clear, in a general way, what rights people
have, qua people. Therefore, we need a deep inquiry, for there is
little point in mere proclamations. Such an inquiry would also
explain why we should even have the rights proposed. But, while
we hardly have the space to undertake such an inquiry here, a
few general things can be usefully said. The viewpoint of this
essay is straightforward and classically liberal: We all have the
right to do whatever we wish, with the very substantial exception
that we may not, in doing what we wish, impose (significant,
avoidable) costs on others.1 This is a slightly more precise way,
perhaps, of expressing the original Hobbesian Law of Nature:
That we are always to ìseek peaceî and to use force only for selfdefense, noting that we may also assist in defending from attack
whoever voluntarily enlists us to do so.2
The same view can be expressed in terms of liberty, a fact
that has given rise to the contemporary use of the term
1 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 92-93 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1991) (1651); JAN NARVESON, THE LIBERTARIAN IDEA 7 (1988).
2 HOBBES, supra note 1, at 92.
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ìlibertarianismî to designate that general outlook. The view, so
expressed, is that we all have a general right to liberty, which
means that we must respect that right on the part of everyone
else, just as they must respect it in relation to us.3 Hobbes
expressed this idea in his Second Law of Nature: That we are ìto
lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much
liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against
himselfe.î4
Why should we accept this general outlook? I have in
various writings defended libertarianism in much the same way
as Hobbes and the other classic writers seem to want to defend it:
namely, as the maximally rational arrangement for
interpersonally regulating the activities of people in society.5 It is
the view that commends itself to us on the broadest interpersonal
basis. In that sense, this Libertarian Principle may also be
claimed as identifying the common good for the general case of
human interaction. The common good is, in effect, liberty.
The reasoning begins with people as they are. What are
they? First, people are possessed of a very wide range of
interests and abilities.
Second, they are capable of
understanding and exchanging ideas about practical matters and
of reacting to the deliberations and decisions of their fellows.
Practical thinking addresses the interests and values we have at
the time and our resources for advancing these, and allows us to
decide what to do in light of this information (including the
decision to seek more information). While each of us operates in
an environment that includes physical things and situations,
such as weather, our environment also includes other people. We
know some people in our conscious neighborhood, but we also
have the knowledge that there are many more not so much
farther on and a very great many more still farther on.
Some of these people will be ones with whom we interact
more or less. The special feature about interaction with fellow
humans is that it can be, and often is, strategicóA reacts to Bís
reaction to Aóand how we act toward another person is a
function in part of what we think the other person will do. That,
in turn, is a function of what we take his reasoning processes to
be, including how we expect him to react to our own behavior.
3 See J. Charles King, Moral Theory and the Foundations of Social Order, in THE
LIBERTARIAN READER 16, 27 (Tibor R. Machan ed., 1982). See generally JAN NARVESON,
THE LIBERTARIAN IDEA (Temple Univ. Press 1988).
4 HOBBES, supra note 1, at 92.
5 JAN NARVESON, THE LIBERTARIAN IDEA (Temple Univ. Press 1988); Jan Narveson,
Contracting for Liberty, in JUSTICE: ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 55, 55-65
(James P. Sterba ed., 4th ed. 2003); Jan Narveson, Libertarianism, in THE BLACKWELL
GUIDE TO ETHICAL THEORY 306, 306-24 (Hugh LaFollette ed., 2000).
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While that may sound complicated, the very truth of this fact
can be made to work in favor of relatively simple principles. All
of us, potentially, have much to fear from our fellows who can, at
the worst, kill or do other terrible things to us. But we also all
have, potentially, much to gain from our fellows, even though
their tastes and specific abilities vary so widely. Such wide
variation is important, for it means that helping our fellows,
especially in major respects, is likely to be difficult and to require
subtle and detailed knowledge of others that we do not typically
have. On the other hand, it is fairly easy to know what would
hurt, damage, or kill others.
The stage is set, then, for a sort of ìdealîóthe ìsocial
contractî in its classic form. The main agreement point calls
upon all to refrain from harming, injuring, and generally
interfering with each other, except only in the case where the
other party is actively attempting to hurt or injure us. But with
regards to helping others, here we rely on specific arrangements
made between interested parties. The principle for those, then,
is simply to keep oneís agreements once made. Between the two,
what we have is a fully cooperative societyóa society in which
we all cooperate in supporting the conditions in which we can
each work or play or interact with others to maximum, mutual
advantage.
Non-aggression underpins society; cooperative
mutually advantageous action via specific negotiation,
agreement, and contract propels it forward to the general
betterment, in the end, of all. Law has its place in this, providing
structure where needed to promote this cooperative state of
affairs. Both criminal and civil law work to curb our tendency to
bypass cooperation (by larceny, violence, or fraud) for our own
personal gain. Civil law especially works to enable us to redress
damages in arrangements gone awry.
It is, I think, extremely difficult to improve on this general
structure of basic rights. And it is that structure that enables us
to focus specifically on the rights of the Consumer in the
extremely important area of commercial transactions.
C.

Property

Probably the most vexing single question about social
matters, and especially about economic matters in society, is
whether individual ownership of thingsóprivate propertyóis
justifiable. To see why it plausibly is, we need but appreciate
that the right to property can be seen as a spin-off from the
general libertarian outlook. The right of property, if it is one,
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exists antecedently to any acts of any governmentsóit is not
If a
identified, informed, or legislated by governments.6
government passes a piece of legislation about property, our
question is: does it act consistently with the antecedently
knowable right of property? The word of government is not what
establishes the property right. Or, to put it in stronger terms,
governments have no authority whatsoever that they do not have
purely by virtue of being formulators and perhaps enforcers of
the ìnaturalî lawóthe moral rules that pass muster with
rational agents generally.7
So, is there a right to property or not? I side with Locke on
the matter in holding that there is, though not quite exactly for
his stated reason.8 Still, his reason is pretty good. Property, in
Lockeís view, is the result of somebodyís efforts, somebodyís
labor. His right of property is nothing more than his right to do
the things he has done and wants to continue to do in relation to
the items in question.9 That is what property is: the right to use
and to continue using the thing in question as one wants. More
generally, it is the right to determine the disposition of the thing
owned; others must clear any proposed uses of it with the person
said to be the ìowner.î If our state-of-nature Crusoe, as it were,
has plowed up some ground or hacked a table out of a tree, with a
view to planting or playing gin rummy or whatever, then if
anyone comes along and undertakes some other use of that item,
a use incompatible with Crusoeís purposes, then that person is
an aggressor. He has, by his actions, intervened to upset the
pattern of Crusoeís own activityóthe very thing that our general
right of liberty forbids. Once initial possession is clear, we
proceed by exchange as well as by work. Once anyone owns
something and anyone else owns something else, they are
morally in a position to make an exchange if they so desire.
The classical liberal tradition has it, in Lockeís terminology,
that we ìown ourselves.î10 Discussants have attached all sorts of
exotic meanings to this phrase, but, in fact, its meaning is quite
straightforward and yields a result that is simply identical with
the Libertarian Principle. To ìownî something is to be in a
position of authority over its use, so that anyone else who wants
to use it in some way must, in principle, obtain the permission of
the owner. In short, owners are people with the right to exclude.
6 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 287-88 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
7 See generally Steven J. Eagle, The Development of Property Rights in America and
the Property Rights Movement, 1 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POLíY 77 (2002).
8 LOCKE, supra note 6, at 287-88.
9 Id.
10 Id.
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And so self-ownership is the right to exclude others from the use
of oneself: if they want you to do something, or to do something to
you, they must ask. That is exactly what the libertarian
principle asserts. Ownership of things outside the self is, in
effect, an application of the rights termed ìself-ownershipî to
such things by virtue of the agentís self-initiated actions
involving those things.
Obviously, any rights identified in this way are subject to the
restriction that they are exercised during ìgood behaviorî: that is
to say, that the exerciser has not done anything that would
warrant abridging his right in some way. Thus, the thief does
not have the right to what he has taken, and others may seize it
by force if need be (and collect costs of apprehension and perhaps
also to provide some extra disincentive for doing such things in
the future. Just how to adjust these disincentives is a difficult
matter that, fortunately, we will not need to go into here.)
In short, property rights in things outside ourselves are a
subset of liberty rightsóthe general right of liberty being the
basic right from which all other legitimate ones are derived,
given appropriate descriptions of the relevant circumstances. It
may perhaps be unnecessary to add that this basic right is what
we nowadays call a ìnegativeî right (a right that others not do
something to the rightholder), not a ìpositiveî right (a right that
the rightholder be in some way assisted in doing the things he
has this right to do). If I want your help, I have to ask for it, or
make an offer for it, and I get the help only if this request or this
offer is accepted.
D. Realism
It may certainly be suggested that this program is, in these
days of big government, unreal. After all, we all live in an
environment in which governments, at many levels, have
immense powers going far beyond anything that the classical
libertarian rights endorse.11 If we start with the premises of
classical liberalism, we appear to be saying that virtually
everything done by virtually every government is immoral and
should be illegal.12

11 See generally ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA ch. 6 (1974);
AMERICAN RADICAL THOUGHT: THE LIBERTARIAN TRADITION (Henry J. Silverman ed.,
1970); TIBOR R. MACHAN, INDIVIDUALS AND THEIR RIGHTS 100-102 (1989) (discussing the
libertarian view of individual rights).
12 See generally L. T. HOBHOUSE, LIBERALISM (1964) (discussing the classical traits of
liberalism); THEODORE MEYER GREENE, LIBERALISM: ITS THEORY AND PRACTICE (1957)
(discussing modern misconceptions of classical liberalism).
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There are two very different ways to respond to such an
objection. On the purely theoretical front the only acceptable
response is to pick up the glove and say to the defenders of big
government, ìProve it!î I think we are in a position to guarantee
that they will be unable to do this, but perhaps it does not matter
for present purposes.
Another, perhaps more pertinent response, is to say that it is
still worth finding out what consumer (or other economic) rights
are as issuing from the libertarian view because it is the general
view underlying our economic system. This person we are calling
ìthe consumerî is operating in a market environment. In the free
economy no one is required to be a producer. Those who produce
typically act with a view to profit, and consumers consume with a
relentless eye to their own satisfaction and no sense of obligation
to the people who supply their needs. Therefore, the converse is
true: We are to presume that a given firm is after our dollarsó
not our health, education, welfare, or happiness. We are out for
those things and many moreónotably our comfort and our
entertainment. We do not need any other justification whatsoever
for spending our dollars as we do. We ìConsumersî are, in this
system, sovereign, king. The Consumer calls the shots. Nobody
may tell him what to buy or why. Nobody may dictate prices to
him. He makes his own decisions, and that is the end of the
matter.
III. CONSUMER RIGHTS
A.

The Basics

Nevertheless, it is useful to spell out a bit more precisely
what follows in the way of rights specific to consumers from the
thesis that the consumer shares with all the general right to be
and do whatever he or she wishes to be and do, subject to the
constraint of respecting the same right for all others. For this
purpose, we first need to look at a matter of fundamental
importance to any theory of rights of this general type: the
baseline of interaction. For present purposes, that baseline is our
encounter in the marketplace, an encounter between two free
beings. However, we will stipulate here that this encounter is
not only between ìfreeî beings, but also innocent beings, in the
sense that we are presumed not to have done anything previously
that would justify curtailment of the standard rights. If we are
guilty of some punishable failing in the past, that may impugn
our status as free-market participants. But we shall take it that
few persons are guilty in that way, and our question is: What is
owed to persons in this normal case, where relevant innocence
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characterizes the parties?
On this libertarian view, everyone is subject to a general
requirement, or obligation, to respect the freedom of all others.
There is a more precise way to summarize this general
obligation, which has been admirably formulated by David
Gauthier in what he calls the ìLockean Proviso.î13 The Gauthier
version says: ìDonít better by worsening. Do not make yourself
better off than you would have been in someone elseís absence, by
making that person worse off than he would have been in your
absence.î14 In short, do not worsen the net situation of the person
with whom you interact. (ëNetî is needed here: the dentistís
benefits come at some cost in pain and discomfort, but on the
whole she leaves her patient better off.) It will be appreciated
that the ìProviso,î so conceived, is really another restatement of
the Libertarian Principle. I believe we can also see that it
provides a fruitful key to the matter of consumer rights.
B.

Describing the Goods

Transactions in the business society are voluntary. The
potential purchaser is under no general obligation to buy, and
the seller is under no obligation to sell. (Of course, either may be
under such obligations from, say, a spouse or friends or other
persons with special involvements, but that lies beyond our
purview.) Both agents, then, are in the marketplace because
they have interests, wants, desires, and values that they hope to
satisfy by their market activities. And thatís it. But while this is
true and fundamental, we must also appreciate an important
basic aspect of any exchange: that the parties proceed on the
basis of descriptions of whatever is being exchanged. One party,
the seller, in effect starts the ball rolling by making an offer. The
other party is presumably in search of some or other good or
service: she contemplates the offer in question and decides to
take it or not. How does she do this? She must have some
information prior to purchase or rejection, and this information
must, in the nature of the case, come at least in part from the
seller. Simply by recognizing that the other party is a seller with
something to sell (and the seller recognizing a buyer with intent
to buy), a fair amount of information has already been processed,
13 The expression is rather misleading, since it has little to do with the ìprovisoî
urged by Locke to limit our acquisition of property. It is, accordingly, to be understood
here as simply Gauthierís coined phrase for the principle he adumbrates, not as a
reference back to the very disputable and disputed phrase in Lockeís writings that
stimulated its recent prominence. DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT 205-11
(1986).
14 David Gauthier, Uniting Separate Persons, in RATIONALITY, JUSTICE AND THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT 176, 182 (David Gauthier & Robert Sugden eds., 1993).
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of course. But getting us to the point where the consumer says
ìYesî and hands over his money and the seller hands over the
goods or performs the contracted-for services requires more. The
ìmoreî in question is in effect or (more usually) in fact a
description of what is to be sold.
In a sense, there are two other sources of information for this
description. First, there is previously acquired information or
background information that potential purchasers are free to
acquire by doing whatever homework they may like and be able
to do.
They might read Consumersí Reports, talk with
acquaintances, and so on. But second, there is what the seller
says about his product in his sales pitch or in the labeling of that
product. (It can even be nonverbal: he can hold up the goods for
the potential buyer to see for himself, or feel, or even sample.)
What is easily overlooked or underestimated in this process is
that information is conveyed by standard usage of whatever
terminology is employed. When the merchant describes the goods
in some way or another, he employs a language, one spoken in
common by himself and the buyer.15 In both cases, then, there is
a communicative process, one that can be misused, derailed, or
otherwise go wrong.
C.

Caveat Emptor?

When there is a description of the goods, even one so simple
as applying a familiar single common noun to it, the consumer
gets a message. Which message? There is the one the consumer
infers from that structure of words (or whatever mode of
communication is employed), and then there is what the
purveyor intended to convey. The first is a potential problem
because the consumer may get information from two different
sources: the public rules of the language (the ìstandard meaningî
of the terms), and, in addition, from a body of impinging
information that may indefinitely modify his interpretations.
The second presents a different problem since we must expect
that the seller will want to bias the information in such a way as
to increase the likelihood of turning the potential buyer into an
actual buyer to the sellerís profit. A satisfactory theory of
consumer-seller relations needs to cope with both sources of
ìnoise.î
Here is where a first important entry into what we may
consider to be consumer rights takes place. Words are public,
15 If their languages are not the same, they must work through interpreters, of
course, but this only complicates the same process, for the interpreter attempts to match
the vocabulary of the one language with a vocabulary from the other for the purposes at
hand.
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and for that very reason, they are mostly standard. If the seller
employs a special word, say a technical term or even one
contrived by the seller for the purpose, then the consumer will
need to have this explained somehow. The process of doing so
will again employ standard language and may again run into
noise
from
the
consumerís
peripheral
sources
of
information/misinformation.
Still, we can already see that this is where Caveat Emptor
breaks down. The idea behind it is that the Consumer bears all
the risk in an exchange. But for it to be reasonable to hold that
he does bear it, Consumer must know what he is getting into.
But knowing that requires some kind of language, and language
is intrinsically not the sort of thing that the consumer by himself
can control. Language is not two Humpty Dumptys deciding to
use words however they wish. The need to communicate makes
that idea a non-starter.
It has become commonplace in
philosophy nowadays that the idea of a ìprivate languageî is
impossible,16 but that need not concern us here. All that matters
to us, in this hands-on, arms-length world of business relations,
is that for carrying on transactions in the marketplace, a public
language is indispensable. In communications, the risks are
shared. I decide how to interpret you, you decide how to
interpret me. Neither of us can do that unless we have some
basis for interpretationóand neither of us as individuals
supplies that basis. Instead, the public rules of language do that.
All speakers must take responsibility for what they mean, and
that responsibility is rooted in public meanings.
D. Three Components of Meaning
So, what exactly does ìstandard languageî convey in its
designative capacity? Enormous amounts of philosophizing
about language could leave one thoroughly confused on that
subject, but it had better not be that difficult. We may here
distinguish three components likely to enter into the structuring
of these messages. First, there will be what we will call
ìdictionary meanings.î
True, we can then ask, ìWhich
dictionaries do we go by? What do dictionary compilers think
they are doing?î
But while those questions are askable,
legitimate, and important, it remains that dictionaries do get
written and people do make use of them for the very good reason
that we do have problems, and we know that solving them
requires public rules. It makes sense to try to codify those.
Dictionaries are attempts at such codification, articulating the
16

For the classic argument, see Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations.
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standard meanings of the day. They help. Second, there are
informal accretions to meaning from community experienceóbut
communities vary. One such community may attach a rather
different accretion of meaning than another, thus complicating
life for the would-be student of commerce. And finally, what can
be regarded as a special subset of the previous category, there is
the fund of commonly known information in the consumer
community. This last is not strictly ìpart of the meaning of the
wordî and yet, there it isótypically both the consumer and the
seller know it.
All of this enables us to make a suggestion. Consumer goods
are typically designated by some one or some very few words in a
phrase standardly applied to the items in question. The word or
label, ìF,î when it denotes some usable thing, ordinarily conveys
the sense that the thing will serve a certain purpose or
purposesóthe one or ones familiarly implied by the name in
question via any or all of the three sources of meaning mentioned
above. If I say this is a ìrakeî I am conveying to you the
information that it will be useful for raking, say leaves or other
such things. If it is a potato peeler, I convey that it will be useful
for that.
Such functional description is pervasive in
Consumerland for the obvious reason that the Consumer is here
in the marketplace precisely because he or she is in search of
something that will serve some purpose or purposes known
especially to her or him. Thus, it is those purposes that need to
be known so that they can be catered to by the manufacturer and
then by the retailer of those items. The development of a
vocabulary that more or less precisely conveys the functions in
question is, thus, an essential for efficient market exchange.
E.

Criteria and Standards

The relevant criteria for assessing performance of a
consumer good are based on the goodís purpose(s). But then the
question arises, how well will it serve that purpose? Given that
the consumer must act on information at hand, that question is,
in effect, how well can we expect it to serve that purpose given
the description under which it is being proffered? Here we get
into what could be a delicate issue. But there is a plausible,
indeed arguably indispensable, general condition that we can
invoke: If Seller doesnít qualify the description, then Consumer
legitimately assumes that it will perform at least normally for
the purposes in question. No precise definition of ìnormalî is
intended, or perhaps possible, for this purpose; nevertheless, the
point is that if what Consumer gets under the description ìFî
performs so miserably as to be unrecognizable, then he has a
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complaint. Consumer is entitled to descriptions employing
normal language, in the absence of special cues or qualifications,
and normal language carries with it connotations of normalcy in
performance unless qualifications are explicitly invokedóa
process that can easily be initiated given the ready availability of
more language. It is easy for Seller to alter his claim, after all. If
what he is selling is substandard and known to be, he can say so.
He often does: one can often find a ìsubstandardî rack at much
reduced prices. That is as it should be. No wrong is done by
Seller in offering low-quality goods so long as he does not
describe his offerings in such a way as to lead a normal user of
the language to believe they are standard or better. It is when he
does not, and yet his goods are indeed below normal performance
levels, that the consumer has a beef.
As a rule of thumb, we may suggest that goods found to be
substandard when they are not explicitly billed as such may be
returned to Seller for a full refund. Should this be a right? It is a
strong presumption, and any company that does not do this will
soon get a reputation for unreliability. It may be best to leave it
at that.
We can invoke our third identified source of information as
well. In addition to the very meaning of the words we use, there
is the fairly closely related matter of what we may call
Community Information. It is often reasonable to assume that
Consumer ìknowsî certain things, and it would be a boreóeven
insulting perhapsóto mention the facts in question. But, of
course, in different communities different things will be items of
familiar knowledge. So it might be possible to seriously mislead
customers in place A with descriptions that would cause no
problems at all in place B. Sellers need to be (and almost always
are) aware of these disparities in background information-levels
and must act accordingly.
How does all this accord with our starting point of general
rights of freedom? The answer is found by identifying the status
quo of Consumer vis-‡-vis Seller at the point of exchange, the
marketplace. Seller presumes certain general things about
Consumer. Specifically, he presumes that Consumer is ìin the
market forî an item of type ìF,î and that he has a ìnormalî level
of information about Fs and, for that matter, normal interests in
using his F when he gets it. Sellerís function in selling is that
Consumerís acquisition of an F leaves Consumer better off than in
the status quo, this being why he is there at all.
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Making the Consumer Happy?

Now, part of this would get us into Subjectivity Land in a
way that no sane code of consumer law could tolerate. Did
Consumer make a ìgood buy?î Thatís for Consumer to decide. It
is certainly not rational to require Seller to provide Consumer
with something that he will be ìhappyî with. Seller surely hopes
to do this and would love it if he succeeded, for to succeed at this
is to leave a Consumer who is ready to come back for more. But
meanwhile, there is a question of where to set the bottom line: At
what point does Consumer actually have a complaint? When do
we reasonably judge that his rights have been infringed or
violated? To make such a judgment, we need to know whether
the objective facts about the particular sample of F that
Consumer acquired on the basis of the description provided by
the Seller live up to what is reasonably understood to have been
conveyed by that information. And that is something we can find
out, albeit at the level of imprecision that it is reasonable to
expect in such matters.
ìHere: you said this was a ëtoy submarine.í But it doesnít
submerge! I want my money back!î It is no good, at this point,
for Seller to respond, ìBut I didnít say it would submerge.î The
language used is such that he didnít need to say that. On the
contrary, the language used is such that he did have to say that
it would not submerge if indeed he knew it would not. What if he
didnít know it wouldnít submerge, but nevertheless, the fact
remains that it doesnít? Here we get into the question of what
degree of epistemic responsibility for product performance do we
members of the broader community reasonably expect of our
Seller? This is no trifling matter nowadays when sales persons
typically sell all manner of immensely complicated things whose
inner workings are a complete mystery to the consumer, the
seller, and even the defense lawyer. Again, it is the sellerís
description of the goods that licenses certain general
expectations.
If the product does not live up to those
expectations, then whether or not Seller knew or had reason to
know of its actual performance characteristics, his description
commits him to a certain standard of performance. If it fails, he
must take responsibility for thatóagain, unless he explicitly
qualifies this in advance. The Consumer needs to know what
heís getting into in order for his purchase to be rational. But
often he doesnít know, and neither does Seller. So for second
best, Consumer reasonably expects a certain level of performance,
and Seller knows that he has this reasonable expectationóknows
it because he knows the meaning of the language in which he
describes the product and, in addition, the typical array of
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information that any consumer in that market would be expected
to have. Given all this, it is reasonable to hold the seller to what
his description conveys.
G. How Much Information?
Another basic question that arises here is: How much
information about his products does the seller need to supply to
pass muster, morally speaking? It would be easy to overstate
this and to say, ìthe whole truth.î But that is not reasonable.
We must distinguish between the Whole Truth, on the one hand,
and Nothing But the Truth on the other. It is the latter, not the
former, for which Seller is responsible. If Seller says what is
false, he is liable. Not saying all that is true, however, is quite
another matter.
Not the least of the reasons why it is
unreasonable to make Seller responsible for the whole truth is
that neither he nor anyone else actually knows the whole truthó
about anything.
No doubt there will always be further
information turning up about any given thing, product or
otherwise. Moreover, some of this information just might turn
out to be quite pertinent. Who can know? But whatever Seller
does say about it, he can be held to account for. If he does not
know, all he has to do is confess his ignorance. At some point, of
course, his ignorance may be below the minimum required to
participate in the sale of the item in question. But above that
line, ignorance is not surprising and is forgivable.
However, Seller might know something of importance to a
purchase of the particular item in question, and not say so. Then
there can be an issue whether he had a responsibility to say that.
Now, the fundamental line is the status quo of our rational
consumer at the time of purchase. Will purchase of the item
being sold leave the consumer better off than if heíd just stayed
home and kept his money? If not, and if the reason was not some
change of taste or interest on the part of Consumer but was due
instead to the performance of the purchased item in ways known
to Seller but not revealed to Consumer, then Seller is at fault.
On the other hand, if the item is, say, just mediocre and Seller
knew that but did not volunteer the information, then, while it
would have been virtuous for Seller to pipe up and volunteer this
possibly useful further information, he is not guilty of fraud but
merely of sharpish practice. That should not surprise anyone,
including Normal Canny Consumer. Seller may live to regret it:
the competitor down the street may be more forthright, and
Sellerís former customers may flock to the competitorís store and
desert the tightlipped merchant. Fair enough.
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Suppose that Consumer can get the same item down the
street at Ziggyís for 40% less: Is Seller responsible for providing
this information? Surely not. There needs to be a fair division of
labor, as it were, regarding the discovery and supplying of
information.
And, of course, Consumer, who has many
advantages over Seller, has this one in particular: He can put
Seller on the spot by simply asking. Then the requirement that
Seller, whatever else he does, not intentionally produce false
information covers the Consumer very well. Consumer uses his
own judgment in deciding how to interpret non-answers, but our
principle protects him in the case of false answers.
In noting that Consumer ìcan put Seller on the spot by
simply asking,î we enter into another of those difficult areas of
modern life. For in modern Consumerland, asking is not so easy
after all, as anyone with an obscure computer problem who
attempts to query the manufacturer can testify. Indeed, there
needs to be much thought about just how ìsimplyî the consumer
should be able to ask.
Meanwhile, we can differentiate this type of case, of nonculpable ignorance on the part of the Seller, from the preceding
one, in which Consumer is deliberately misled, by suggesting
that while the consumer may not have a right to Sellerís acting
on the basis of common knowledge, it would nevertheless be a
very good idea for the company to take the familiar attitude (or
at least, an attitude that once was familiar) that ìThe customer
is always right.î This puts the onus on Seller, even though it
must be admitted that customers can have rather bizarre ideas
about expected performance. Still, good business is one thing
and what we may insist on as a matter of right is another. The
customer whose expectations are well out of line with standard
meanings and normally known information is, in truth, wrong.
But a company that extends the benefit even of unreasonable
doubt to such customers may well win many more customers.
H. How Fine the Print?
There often are things Seller needs to make clear. As such,
how easy must it be for Consumer to get the message in order for
us to rule that Seller has done his duty? A small page covered
with microscopic print might be good enough if Consumer is most
unlikely ever to need the information; not so, however, if itís
something he really should be aware of before going further, with
significant risk to himself if he is not. Here again, it is difficult to
formulate a precise standard that would cover all or even most
cases. What we can say is that this is a relevant variableóthat
the complaint, ìbut it was practically indiscernible!î is often a
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justified complaint.
Perhaps we had best settle for the
suggestion that Consumer is entitled to have necessary
information conveyed in such a way as to be absorbable without
major effort, and let it go at that.
I.

Health and Safety

One of the most important areas for applying our libertarian
non-harm principle is that of health and safety. We want what
we buy to do us good, not harm. We want it to leave us in a state
of health no worse than when we began. If the product is sold as
a health-enhancement product, then we have a right to expect
that it will leave us not only no worse off, but actually better off,
in the specific ways that the manufacturer claims, while leaving
us no worse off in any other way. This expectation is, again,
prima facie: A health-enhancing product might have known
negative side effects, and Seller must duly warn Consumer of
these facts when known. Our non-harm criterion, however,
continues to apply regarding things not mentioned on the list of
known side effects.
But all these are questions of degree, and what is more, the
degree is especially that of probability. Simply, few products will
make you sick or not. Almost all will increase or decrease the
probability that you will become sick with this, that, or the other.
The big question, then, is: What reasonable standard is there for
determining merchant liability if things go wrong? How wrong
must they go before Seller is liable?
J.

Liberty and Risk

The first point I would make on this matter of risk is that
the consumer should have his choice about this. In so saying, I
appear to be taking a position radically at odds with current
trends in consumer law and the mores of commercial life as I
understand them. According to these trends, risk is borne
virtually entirely by the Seller. Consumer is protected not only
from defects in products, including ones that may have been
unpredictable by the Seller, but also from Consumerís own poor
judgment. For instance, Consumer might buy a product which
he knows is dangerous in some wayóthe case of cigarette
smoking obviously comes to mind. May a consumer sue a
cigarette manufacturer when he gets lung cancer from regularly
smoking the latterís product, even though fully informed about
likely risks of doing so? My answer is a flat negative. Unless
some manufacturer was so foolish as to assure the purchaser that
no damage to his health would be forthcoming, the current (and
long-standing) climate of information is such that a consumer

NARVESON FINAL MAY 28

197

5/28/2004 4:47 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 7:181

voluntarily purchasing a pack of cigarettes may be safely
assumed to know what the risks are. There could still be places
in the world where that is not so, I suppose, and in those few
cases, we may agree that the smoker could have a case. And in
any case, the manufacturer could (and is now legally required to)
issue a clear warning. If Consumer buys nonetheless, then the
only reasonable view is that the case is closed. With consumer
rights should come consumer responsibilities. If we walk in
voluntarily and with our eyes open, then we take responsibility
for the consequences of our actions, so long as there is not actual
malice on the part of the other party.
One of the most colossal extravagances of the American
government today is found in its elaborate requirements for
pharmaceuticals. For such things to make it to the market an
ordeal awaits; new drugs are subjected to onerous testing
procedures that take many years to complete and increase the
cost of development by a huge factor. During these many years,
many people die because they cannot acquire drugs that would
have likely saved their lives. The lives that are saved by the
extensive testing must be set against the lives that would have
been saved by earlier access to the drugs, and it is widely held
that the second set of deaths vastly outnumbers the first.17 This
is a major-league denial of Consumer liberty. It is an implicit
assumption that consumers do not know what they are doing.
And, insofar as manufacturers are held to the standards of the
FDA, it is an assumption of unconcern by manufacturers. All
this goes against the environment of freedom to which, I think,
we people are entitled.
Were there no FDA, it would be easy enough for private
companies to set up in business appraising and testing drugs;
those which passed to a very high standard would be rated as
such, and the rating company could assume liability for error.
Pharmaceutical companies would advertise the ratings earned in
this way as a selling point for their products; products that did
not pass specific tests would have to be described as such. The
consumer wanting more protection could look to this
ìpharmaceutical Underwriterís Laboratoriesî and pay the price;
others could take greater risks and pay less. Consumers
knowingly buying less-tested products would not be able to sue;
consumers buying more-tested products that nevertheless fail
17 Daniel B. Klein & Alexander Tabarrok, Is the FDA Safe and Effective?, The
Independent Institute, at http://www.fdareview.org/fda.pdf (last updated Sept. 26, 2001);
Sam Kazman, Deadly Overcaution: FDAís drug Approval Process, 1 J. REG. & SOC. COSTS
35 (1990), available at http://www.cei.org/gencon/019,03887.cfm (last visited Mar. 11,
2004).
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could sue.
(And companies implicated could sue the
Underwriters if the latter were found to have done inadequate or
improper testing when proper testing was promised.) You would
pay your money and take your choice. As things now stand, you
only pay your money, or do without, or try to get it from a foreign
source. The consumer deserves better than that.
K. Managing Risk
Two questions arise. First, how much risk should be taken
to be ìnormal?î And second, how thorough and how precise does
Seller have to be about what he puts on his labels by way of
warning the customer of risks?
Regarding the first: nothing that anyone does is risk-free. To
live is to be subject to risk. Some of our activities elevate the level
of risk we face in some respects: driving a car incurs a risk of
having some kind of accident, skiing can be lethal, and so on.
Common sense is enough to identify some of these, but assorted
products entail risks that common sense would not know about.
The unobvious surely needs mentioning. But at what point does
the obvious need noting? Parents may need to be warned about
toys that might be risky for children. But thereís not much point
in manufacturers trying to warn the children themselves, and
what parent is unaware of the dangers of childhood activities?
How risky do things need to be before the user even needs to be
warned? It would be nice to be able to say something more
interesting than ìsignificantly riskyîóbut still, that is the right
answer. The risk must be more than is obvious to common sense
and significantly greater than the normal risks of everyday
activity. (The two sets are not quite coextensive.) Further, to be
significant, it must be at least discernible. If the probability of
breaking your leg or getting killed from using product X is about
the same as what it would be if you stayed home and watched
TV, it does not need to be mentioned. If it is a thousand times
higher, it probably does. But if itís only three times as high? Or
seventeen? Seventeen times .00001 is still very small. But a
thousand times that is .01, which is not.
When warning is needed, because the risks involved are
larger than the background ones just noted, how large does the
print have to be? How precise does the information need to be?
These are not easy issues, but neither are they imponderable.
The print has to be at least normally legible and the information
can be quite approximate in normal casesóbut, if youíre selling it
to scientists, it had better be much more precise. Buying and
selling take place in a particular market environment, and the
levels of these variablesóprint-size, size of background risk, and,
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hence, need to warnórequire adjustment to suit. In the U.S.
today, a new factor in our legal environment is the apparent
willingness of courts to protect the consumer against himself in
tort casesó$2.9 million for a cup of too-hot coffee spilled on an
irate lady, for example.18 The courts now proceed on a principle
having virtually nothing to do with the original purpose of torts,
namely to compensate victims of injuries that were fairly clearly
the fault of some other party. But in so doing, they ìprotectî
people at the expense of all the rest who have to pay the higher
prices necessary to sustain the damage suits imposed by some
few careless or malicious persons with the aid of the courts.
Just what is the right solution to risk problems? That is a
much investigated question, and rightly so. The suggestion here
is fairly rudimentary: What Seller basically owes to Buyer is not
to significantly increase his marginal involuntary net risk.
Estimating that is not easy, and the fact that it is not (when it is
not) is itself relevant and can be made part of the information
package. But it is the right idea.
IV. THE BOTTOM LINE: CONSUMER SOVEREIGNTY
The maxim Caveat Emptor has much to be said for it.
Provided it is understood how and when the merchant can be in
the wrong, there must be a region in which the consumer makes
his own decisions and takes responsibility for them. If there is no
misdescription of the goods, if there is no reason to expect net
damage to health from her purchase, then the consumerís final
protection does indeed lie in the fact that she can, as noted at the
outset, simply say No. The wise merchant will do his best to see
to it that the consumer says Yesóafter all, thatís how he makes
his living. But his ìbestî after all has to be compatible with
making a profit, and this means among other things keeping
costs down. Absolute certainty that the customer is going to be
happy is not to be had and attempts to achieve it would make all
goods prohibitively expensive. That, of course, does no service to
the consumer either. A happy medium is needed, and that
medium is best understood as an understanding, between seller
and buyer, that is rational from both points of view. In that
respect, the proposals in this essay have merely been faithful to
the idea of the market. And that idea is a good oneóthe market
answering to that idea is by far the best institution we can have
for such things.
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